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1 Introduction
The aim of the present paper is to study the impact of active labor market policies (ALMPs)
on the duration of unemployment in Switzerland. The new Swiss ALMPs reflect the increasing
consensus among policy makers that actively assisting the unemployed in job search is preferable
to simply providing them with passive income support. The danger is, so the argument goes,
that reliance on passive income support may reduce work incentives and job-search activities
and therefore increase the risk of long-term unemployment. ALMPs are seen by many as the
key to minimize these risks.
Despite the agreed importance of ALMPs the success of the adopted programs has been
mixed for most countries. In a recent overview of Swedish ALMPs Calmfors et al. (2001)
concludes that the effects are rather disappointing. Swedish studies show for example that labor
market training has no or negative employment effects, whereas many studies indicate that
programs have a locking-in effect, which is the case if participants are not willing to exit from
the programs before they are completed. Furthermore, it does not seem to be a good idea to use
ALMPs as an income support measure (Calmfors et al., 2001). Martin and Grubb (2001) draw
similar conclusions in their overview on what works and what does not work among ALMPs
in OECD countries. They conclude, for example, that subsidies to employment and direct job
creation have been of little success in helping unemployed get permanent jobs. Heckman et al.
(1999) also give an overview of the dispersion in the effects of ALMPs.
The question how participation in ALMP-measures affects labor market histories of individu-
als has been the subject of substantial debate in the econometric literature. In this literature, the
main problem usually concerns the possible endogeneity of ALMP-participation (See Heckman
et al., 1999). The problem is that labor market outcomes for participants may be systematically
different from non-participants for reasons (other than ALMP-participation as such) that are
unobservable to the researcher. This is the well-known selection problem. In Switzerland, like
2
in most European countries, but unlike in the U.S., randomized social experiments are uncom-
mon, so one has to deal with non-experimental data. In theory, several methods can be used
to estimate the treatment effects on ALMPs. Each of these matters deals with the selection
problem under different assumptions (Heckman et al., 1999). In the case of unemployment du-
ration as variable of interest two methods are particularly useful. The first one is the ‘method
of matching’, the second one is the ‘timing of events’ method.
The method of matching is based on the conditional independence assumption. That is,
if many variables that influence both labor market outcomes and the selection process are ob-
served, outcomes and selection are independent conditional on the observables. The identifying
assumption is that, after accounting for many observable variables (including individual’s past
labor market performance), no unobserved heterogeneity correlated with labor market programs
and program participation is left. Among the many studies that use the matching approach, the
study of Gerfin and Lechner (2000) is of interest here as they also evaluate the effect of Swiss
ALMPs on unemployment duration. They find that employment programs perform very poorly,
vocational training programs show a rather mixed performance depending on the specific sub-
program considered, whereas the temporary wage subsidy appears to be a successful program
in terms of increasing the chances on the labor market.1
The present paper employs the timing-of-events method to study the impact of ALMPs on
unemployment duration. This method applies a multivariate duration model in which both the
inflow into an ALMP program and the outflow from unemployment are specified and allowed
to interact. Generally, in multivariate duration models the variation in the durations at which
treatment is administered to individuals, and data on the corresponding pre- and post-treatment
durations can be exploited to identify the treatment effect. The identifying assumption is that
transition processes can be modeled as mixed proportional hazards specifications. The intu-
1For a further matching study that also looks at the impact of ALMPs in Switzerland see Prey (2000).
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ition is that, under this assumption, information on the correlations between the unobserved
heterogeneity components in the exit from unemployment and the entrance into ALMPs can be
obtained from (i) the duration until the program starts and (ii) the duration of unemployment.
Because unobserved heterogeneity components are modelled explicitly, the treatment effect is
estimated conditional on observed and unobserved variables taking into account that the unob-
served variables may influence both processes. A formal proof of this is given in Abbring and
Van den Berg (2000).2
We discuss identification issues of the timing-of-events method in more detail below. The
main advantage is that for identification of the treatment effect it is not necessary to have a
valid instrument. Given that economic theory does not suggest a natural instrument, this is a
particularly useful feature of this approach.
The timing-of-events method is relatively new and has been applied in a small number of
previous studies. Gritz (1993), for instance, considers the impact of training on the employment
experience of American youths and Bonnal et al. (1997) study the effect of public employment
policies set up in France during the 1980’s. Both studies deal with the potential selectivity of
the inflow into the treatment state by allowing related unobserved heterogeneity terms to affect
both the inflow into treatment and the inflow into other labor market positions. In these studies,
‘treatment’ has been modeled as a separate labor market state. Other studies assume that the
job finding rate shifts to another level at the moment a worker enters a program, a shift which
Gritz (1993) calls an ‘incidence effect’. Applications of this approach are Abbring et al. (1997)
and Van den Berg et al. (1998) who study the effect of benefit sanctions on the transition rate
from unemployment to employment. Both studies find a significant positive effect of benefit
sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment to a job.3
2Van den Berg (2000) presents an overview of duration models and has a general discussion on the use of
duration models in estimating treatment effects.
3In the study by Van den Berg et al. (1998) it is shown that if unobserved heterogeneity is not accounted
for, no effect of sanctions is found. In Lubyova and Van Ours (2000) the effectiveness of temporary jobs in the
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The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the Swiss labor market
policy in more detail. In Section 3 we provide specific information on our data set, a weighted
random sample of entrants into unemployment in Switzerland over the four—months period
December 1997 to March 1998. The data come from administrative records and contain detailed
information not only on a standard set of individual characteristics but also on the timing and
duration of ALMP-participation. Section 4 discusses the identification of the treatment effects
in more detail and presents the empirical model. The results of our analysis are presented in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Labor market policy in Switzerland
The Swiss government enacted in 1997 a reform of unemployment insurance that constituted a
change away from passive income maintenance towards active measures. The new law obliged
the Swiss cantons to supply a minimum number of ALMP-places per year. Economy-wide,
these requirements add up to a stock of 25,000 places. This compares to an average stock
of unemployment of about 188,000 individuals in 1997 and about 140,000 in 1998. There are
few strict guidelines regarding the allocation of job-seekers to ALMPs. An ALMP must aim
at retraining the job seeker in skills that are directly useful for his or her occupation. Other
than this, the actual selection process is characterized by heterogeneity. Employment service staff
decides on participation based on subjective evaluation of the job-seekers employment prospects.
A job-seeker is not allowed to refuse participation once he or she is assigned to participate in an
ALMP. Refusal to participate results in withholding of benefit payments for a period of 1 to 30
days.4
Slovak Republic is investigated. If selectivity is accounted for, treatment has a positive effect on the transition
from unemployment to a regular job. Van Ours (2001) extends this analysis by also examining the job separation
rates for those unemployed that find a job after having entered a temporary subsidized. He also finds that it is
important to account for initial selectivity of the inflow into these jobs.
4See Lalive, van Ours and Zweimu¨ller (2002) for an evaluation of the Swiss sanction system.
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The ALMP-measures supplied by the regional placement offices can be divided into three
categories:
1. Training courses, of which several types can be distinguished:
a. Courses to improve basic skills. These courses usually last 3 weeks and aim at improving
the effectiveness of individual job search (how to write application letters, how to behave
at job talks) and self-esteem. The courses try to provide unemployed workers with skills for
finding jobs. Part of the courses is intended to give an overview of the available ALMPs.
b. Language courses. These courses last about 2 months and include reading and writing
skills. Language courses are more likely to be attended by foreigners but also native Swiss
attend these courses frequently.
c. Computer courses. These courses last about 3 weeks and refer to basic word processing
and spreadsheet calculation.
d. Other courses. These courses last about 2 months and concern a rather heterogeneous
group of course types, including specific computer training, business administration, tech-
nical training, courses in the tourism and the health sector.
2. Employment programs. These refer to temporary jobs in the non-profit sector, which last
about 5 months.
3. Temporary wage subsidies. This is a program that encourages job seekers to accept job
offers that pay less than their unemployment benefits by compensating the difference such
that the job seeker is slightly better off than without a subsidized job.
Table 1
Table 1 presents detailed descriptive statistics on the programs. These statistics, based on
the dataset we describe in more detail in the next section, indicate that in terms of participants
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training courses and temporary wage subsidies are the most important programs. Unemployed
workers enter a program after about 3 months of unemployment but the variation is considerable
as can be seen from the standard deviation of the elapsed unemployment duration at program
entry. On the one hand there is no deterministic schedule when individuals can enter a program.
On the other hand there were limitations in the supply of ALMPs which created variation in
the unemployment duration at ALMP-entry.
An important feature of the training courses is that a large part of the participants attends
a second program later on. Therefore, it could be the case that part of the unemployed workers
on these courses already anticipate that they will enter a second program later on. Attending a
second program is far less important for participants in employment programs and hardly occurs
for those with temporary wage subsidies.
It is worth noting that various programs also differ in terms of hours spent on the program.
Training courses typically require weekly hours equivalent to a part-time job, whereas the time-
intensity of employment programs are equivalent to a full-time job. Jobs with a wage subsidy
can be either full- or part-time. Finally, one should note that training courses and employment
programs involve costs that go beyond the payment of individual benefits. This is not the case
for temporary wage subsidies. Here, benefits are used only to supplement wage. In terms of
costs the temporary wage subsidies are rather cheap.
The new law increased maximum benefit entitlement and, at the same time, created a close
link between unemployment benefit entitlement and participation in an active measure. For a
newly unemployed the maximum entitlement period is 104 weeks, up from originally 80 weeks.5
This entitlement period is divided into two different parts. For at most 7 months the job-seeker
can receive unemployment benefits, unconditional upon participation in an active measure. For
the remaining 17 months unemployment benefits are paid only if the unemployed is willing to
5The above entitlement regulation holds for an individual who has been employed and has contributed to the
insurance system for at least 6 within the last 24 months.
7
participate in a measure. The actual application of this rule is not as rigid and mechanic. If no
appropriate ALMP-slots are available for an unemployed worker whose unconditional entitlement
is exhausted, the unemployed continues to receive benefits subsequently.
As mentioned by the OECD (1996), the new Swiss unemployment insurance system is an am-
bitious one. Compared to other countries that require the unemployed to enter programs in order
to be entitled to unemployment benefits, the Swiss rules are different in at least two important
respects. First, the intervention takes place at a rather early stage of the unemployment spell,
after seven months. And secondly, benefit payments are conditional upon ALMP-participation
and this participation does not lead to a new benefit entitlement.
3 Data
The data set from which we drew our sample, covers all unemployment entrants in Switzerland
over the period December 1997 to March 1998 and follows these individuals up to the end of May
1999. These data come from administrative records of the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
(AVAM- and ASAL-data base). Among the 70,445 workers who started an unemployment spell
during the above period we concentrate our empirical analysis on a subsample of those workers for
whom we could match the information of the AVAM- and ASAL-data base with information from
social security records (AHV-data). The latter provide detailed information on the individuals’
earnings and employment history over the last 10 years prior to the unemployment spell.
We had only limited access to the social security records. These sample available to us
contains a 50% random sample of the inflow in December 1997, and a 30% random sample of
the inflow from January 1998 to March 1998. In the analysis in section 5 we account for this
by weighting each observation by the inverse of the probability of being in the random social
security sample. The matched sample contains information on 23,562 unemployment spells.
To guarantee uniform benefit entitlement, we excluded all job seekers who were not entitled to
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unemployment benefits (2,719 spells), were re-entering unemployment within a period of two
calendar years (2,443 spells) or were aged younger than 20 years or aged older than 49 years
(2,083 spells). The second and third category of job seekers were excluded because for re-entrants
the time until benefit exhaustion depends on the duration of the previous unemployment spell.
Also, the duration of unconditional benefit exhaustion is longer for workers aged 50 or older.
Job seekers who are younger than 20 are likely to be in between two spells of training and thus
not comparable to the other part of the job seekers. Finally, to get a more homogeneous sample
268 disabled workers, 410 foreign workers with an asylum seeker or seasonal permit, and 2,143
workers whose employability was rated to be very poor were excluded.6 The sample on which
our empirical estimates are based contains 13,496 job seekers.
Figure 1
To account for heterogeneity in the programs we distinguish between training courses, (pub-
lic) employment programs and wage subsidies. Figure 1 shows the monthly empirical hazard
rates for transitions to jobs, training programs, employment programs, and wage subsidies.7
The job hazard rate is increasing in the initial stage of the unemployment spell and reaches a
high of 14 % after a duration of 3 months. Thereafter the hazard rate decreases and falls back to
5 % for the long-term unemployed. Both, the empirical entry-rate to classroom training courses
and the entry-rate to wage subsidies have a shape similar to the job-exit rate, but at a lower
level. The picture is less clear for employment programs where the empirical hazard rate varies
relatively little with duration.
6Information on employability is from the official at the public employment service. This is a subjective rating
of the job seeker by the program administrator which takes values 1 through 5. Levels 4 and 5 exhibit substantially
worse employment chances than levels 1 through 3. We definded levels 4 and 5 to be poor employability and
excluded those workers to get a homogeneous subsample.
7The transition rates are account for censoring by the Kaplan-Meier method.
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4 Modelling treatment effects
4.1 Identification
We use the model of potential outcomes of Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974) to discuss the iden-
tification problem. Our focus is on the effect of participating in an ALMP (the ’treatment’)
on the exit rate out of unemployment to a regular job (the ’outcome’). We define θ0u(t) as the
transition rate from unemployment to jobs without treatment, and θ1u(t) as the transition rate
to jobs with treatment. Furthermore, we define D as the indicator variable that takes the value
1 if an individual is observed participating in the program before he or she exits to a regular job.
If tu is the time (unemployment duration) at which a transition to a job occurs, and tp is the
time at which treatment in the program starts, then D ≡ I(tp < tu).8 With these definitions,
we can write the observed transition rate from unemployment to a job (the actual outcome) as
θu(t) = D θ
1
u(t) + (1−D) θ0u(t).
Note that programs are not considered to be separate states, but once an unemployed worker
enters a program, we assume there is a shift in the transition rate from unemployment to a
regular job. Note further that this shift combines a possible lock-in effect (lower search intensity
during program attendance) with a possible skill-enhancement effect (better job chances after
treatment).
An evaluation study usually aims at identifying the effect of a program on participants in
that program. This is the effect of treatment on the treated which is defined as
exp(δ) =
θ1u(t|D = 1)
θ0u(t|D = 1)
. (1)
So exp(δ) is the shift factor by which the transition rate to jobs changes because of participation
in a program.
8The indicator variable I(.) takes value 1 if the expression is true and 0 otherwise.
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The problem in every evaluation study is that the ’counterfactual’ outcome for partici-
pants, θ0u(t|D = 1), which is the outcome in the hypothetical state of non-participation cannot
be observed (Holland, 1986). Hence the effect of treatment on the treated cannot be identi-
fied without further assumptions. A frequently used identifying assumption is the ’conditional
independence assumption’ (CIA), according to which the outcome, conditional on observed
characteristics, is independent of the treatment status. In terms of hazard rates CIA implies
θ0u(t|x,D = 1) = θ0u(t|x,D = 0). If CIA holds, the effect of treatment on the treated can be
identified by comparing hazard rates of individuals with identical observable characteristics.
CIA is the identifying assumption in the method of matching, to which we have referred in
the introduction.9 This non-parametric identification strategy is appealing because it imposes
no functional form restrictions and allows for heterogeneity in the effect of treatment on the
treated. The requirement is that the dataset is sufficiently rich such that, given the available
data, all systematic differences between participants and nonparticipants can be accounted for.
The ideal situation is one in which participation in ALMPs is determined randomly conditional
on observables.
In Switzerland, the process of allocating job seekers to ALMPs is characterized by substan-
tial heterogeneity on the part of the public employment service and on the part of the job seeker
(Section 2). Job seekers meet once a month with the employment service to decide on participa-
tion. Thus, unobservable information that affects participation in the program and labor market
chances may play a role (i.e. perceived program success). Second, in the dataset there is no
information on objective variables that may be important in determining selection into ALMPs,
the most important of these being education. Finally, the ALMP system was relatively new at
the time of the present analysis. Thus, there is no information in the dataset on the previous
training history by the job seekers. This is an important source of unobserved heterogeneity
9Heckman et al. (1997) discuss the properties of the matching estimator in detail
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that determines participation as well as labor market success.
Thus it is unlikely that participants and nonparticipants do not differ with respect to un-
observables that jointly determine participation in the program and unemployment duration.
Therefore, we use the ’timing-of-events’ methodology which employs a semi-parametric iden-
tification strategy to address self-selection into programs. Doing this requires simultaneous
modelling of the transition from unemployment to a job and the transition from unemployment
to a program.
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity is captured by allowing for characteristics vu that
are unobserved but which affect the transition rate to jobs . The semi-parametric identification
strategy is characterized, essentially, by two assumptions. The first assumption holds that,
conditional on observables x and unobservables vu, participation is independent of potential
outcomes. This is the independence-assumption which implies that
θ0u(t|x,D = 1, vu) = θ0u(t|x,D = 0, vu), and
θ1u(t|x,D = 1, vu) = θ1u(t|x,D = 0, vu). (2)
Potential outcomes are the same for treated and non-treated individuals, conditional on observ-
ables and unobservables. This restriction is less severe than the assumptions needed in order to
identify the average effect of treatment. In particular, we only assume that participation condi-
tional on observables and unobservables is independent of potential unemployment durations.
The second important assumption holds that the covariates x and vu enter the hazard multi-
plicatively separable from elapsed duration t. This is the mixed proportional hazard assumption
that is standard in duration analysis (Van den Berg, 2000) and which may be written as
θu(t|x,D, vu) = λu(t) exp(x0βu + δD + vu). (3)
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λu(t) captures the effect of elapsed duration and βu is a parameter vector measuring the impact
of observable characteristics on the transition rate to a job.
As mentioned above, addressing the problem of possible self-selection into programs requires
simultaneous modelling of the transition rates both to a regular job and to programs. This is
because self-selection meansD and vu are not independent. It is assumed that also the transition
process from unemployment to an ALMP takes the proportional hazard form
θp(t|x, vp) = λp(t) exp(x0βp + vp) (4)
where θp denotes the transition rate from unemployment to program p, λp(t) and βp capture,
respectively, the effect of elapsed duration and of observable characteristics, and vp is the un-
observed heterogeneity component of the inflow into the program. The joint distribution of the
unobserved heterogeneity components is denoted by G(vu, vp).
Abbring and van den Berg (2000) show that the model (3) and (4) is identified. The critical
assumptions are the proportionality and independence assumptions mentioned above. Given
the proportionality assumption, the semi-parametric identification strategy is more restrictive
than the non-parametric identification strategy where no assumption about the functional form
is needed. The independence-assumption, however, is less restrictive as this condition relates to
observables and unobservables. Specifically, the model allows for different effects among individ-
uals with identical observable characteristics due to possible differences along the unobservable
dimension. Moreover, the semi-parametric identification strategy allows explicitly for the fact
that participants may self-select into training based on information that is not observable to the
econometrician.
Intuitively, the timing-of-events method uses variation in unemployment duration and in
duration until the start of the first program (conditional on observed covariates) to identify
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the unobserved heterogeneity distribution.10 As mentioned above, this variation is due to two
sources, as there is no deterministic rule when individuals can enter a program. Moreover, there
were limitations in the supply of ALMPs that created variation in the participants’ elapsed
unemployment duration at ALMP-entry. In order to correct for possible selectivity one needs
(conditional on observed characteristics) homogenous subsamples. Introducing unobserved het-
erogeneity allows one to work with such homogenous subsamples. This method compares the
transition rate from unemployment to regular jobs of individuals within a homogenous group
after the ALMP has started.
The timing-of-events method has a number of advantages. First, it addresses explicitly the
fact that participation in a program may be selective. By accounting for unobservables in the se-
lection process and the outcome process, the ’causal’ effect of the treatment is identified. Second,
there are no exclusion restrictions needed in order to provide identification. This is particularly
advantageous since there is no formal way to select ’valid’ instruments and because there is no
instrumental variables estimator in duration analysis. Third, the estimator is semi-parametric.
While we do assume that covariates shift the hazard in the same proportion irrespective of
elapsed duration of unemployment, the model allows for complete flexibility in the treatment
effect, baseline hazard and in the effect of other covariates.
To avoid biased estimates of the impact of ALMPs on unemployment durations it is necessary
that individuals do not anticipate future events. If an unemployed worker knows that he or she
will have to attend an ALMP in the future, he or she may start to search for a job more strongly.11
For that reason the effect of that ALMP will be underestimated. There are several reasons why
such anticipation effects cannot be of great significant in the case of Swiss ALMP-programs.
First, the time between assignment to a specific program and the actual start of the program is
10Note that it is important to have data on observed covariates affecting the transition rate to jobs and the
transition rate to the program to separately identify unobserved heterogeneity and the effect of observed covariates
with single spell data (Honore´ 1993).
11Black et al. (1998) find that the threat of training may be more effective than training itself in getting the
unemployed back to work.
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usually short, in the range from one to two weeks. Second, an unemployed worker cannot just
start any program. There has to be a vacant slot and if there is one, staff at the employment
service has to approve of participation. Moreover there is competition between unemployed
workers for vacant slots. Third, job seekers are required to continue to search for jobs until
training has started. Nevertheless, section 5 investigates the potential impact of anticipation
effects on the estimated effects of ALMPs on the transition rate to regular jobs.
4.2 The empirical model
The empirical model we will estimate below allows for not only one but three different pro-
grams. Training courses are indexed by c, employment programs by e, and wage subsidies by
w. This means we distinguish four transition rates: from unemployment to a regular job, from
unemployment to a training course, from unemployment to an employment program, and from
unemployment to a subsidized job. Define tc (te, tw) the time from the start of the unem-
ployment spell until either the start of the first training program (employment program, wage
subsidy) or the start of a regular job. Redefine tp = min(tc, te, tw) as the duration until the first
program starts. Define Dc = I[tp = tc, tp < tu], Dc = 1 if the first transition to an ALMP is
a transition to the training program and the transition is observed before a regular job starts,
Dc = 0 otherwise. Equivalently, define De = I[tp = te, tp < tu], and Dw = I[tp = tw, tp < tu].
The transition rate to jobs is
θu(t|x,Dc,De,De, vu) = λu(t) exp(x0βu + δcDc + δeDe + δwDw + vu). (5)
We estimate three treatment effects (δc, δe, δw) . The four parameter vectors (βu,βc,βe,βw)
are estimated using (5) and (4).
In addition to these parameters we have to specify the empirical implementation of (i)
the baseline hazard rate and (ii) the assumption about the joint distribution function of the
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unobserved heterogeneity components vu and vc, ve, and vw. For all four processes we model
flexible duration dependence by using a step function
λx(t) = exp(Σk(λx,k Ik(t)) (6)
where x = u, c, e, w indexes the various processes, k = 1, .., 4 is a subscript for time-intervals
and Ik(t) are time-varying dummy variables for the following time intervals: 0-3 months, 3-6
months, 6-12 months and 12 and more months. Because we also estimate a constant term, we
normalize λx,1 = 0.
It remains to specify G(vu, vc, ve, vw), the joint distribution of the unobserved characteristics
vu, vc, ve, vw. We assumeG to be a multivariate discrete distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
Work by Heckman and Singer (1984) suggests that discrete distributions can approximate any
arbitrary distribution function G. We assume that each transition rate has two points of support
(vu,a, vu,b) for the exit rate out of unemployment to a regular job and (vp,a, vp,b) for the transitions
into the programs, p = c, e,w. Because we distinguish between 3 programs and one outcome
process, this implies that the joint distribution has 16 mass points. The associated probabilities
are denoted as
Pr(vu = vu,a , vc = vc,a , ve = ve,a , vw = vw,a) = paaaa
Pr(vu = vu,a , vc = vc,a , ve = ve,a , vw = vw,b) = paaab
...
Pr(vu = vu,b , vc = vc,b , ve = ve,b , vw = vw,b) = pbbbb (7)
The construction of the likelihood function is discussed in the appendix.
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5 Estimation results
This section discusses the estimated effects of ALMP participation on the transition rate to a
regular job. Both, results based on the assumption that there is no unobserved heterogeneity
and results allowing for correlated unobserved heterogeneity are reported (Table 2). This allows
discussing the impact of selectivity on the estimated treatment effects. We also report the
effect of selected individual characteristics on the transition rate to jobs, training programs,
employment programs and wage subsidy (Table 3). Moreover, four sets of sensitivity analyses are
presented in Tables 4 to 7. First, we investigate whether the effect of ALMP participation differs
with respect to nationality and gender (Table 4). Second, we analyze whether the treatment
effect varies with the duration after the start of the program (Table 5). This is interesting because
our estimates of the treatment effect combine a possible ’locking-in’ effect (lower search intensity
during program attendance) with a possible skill-enhancement effect (improved chances to get
a job after treatment) of the program on the transition rate to jobs. A third sensitivity analysis
reports results based on a model that allows for separate selection processes for four different
types of training programs (Table 6). The final sensitivity analysis discusses the importance of
anticipation effects (Table 7).
Table 2
Estimates that do not account for selectivity in the inflow into the programs show that
temporary jobs (in the non-profit sector) and training programs have a negative and significant
effect on the transition rate to regular jobs (Table 2, Column A). The estimated treatment effect
of temporary jobs in the public sector of -.29 is to be interpreted such that the transition rate to
jobs is estimated to shift downward by 25 % (=exp(-.29)-1) for individuals who participate in
temporary jobs. The exit rate of unemployment decreases by 10 % for individuals attending a
training program. In contrast, the temporary wage subsidy has a significantly positive effect on
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the outflow out of unemployment of 8 %. The results from the model which does not account for
selectivity are in line with the results in the study by Gerfin and Lechner (2000) which is based on
the matching method. They find that employment programs as well as the majority of training
programs significantly reduce the employment rate of participants whereas the temporary wage
subsidy increases employment chances of participants.
After accounting for selectivity the average effect for each of the programs is negative, al-
though for temporary wage subsidies the effect is not significantly different from zero (Table 2,
Column B). The transition rate to jobs is decreased by 46 % for individuals accepting temporary
jobs in the non-profit sector, and by 31 % for individuals in classroom training programs. The
fact that these results differ from the results reported previously suggests that (unobserved)
heterogeneity is relevant. More precisely, there is positive selection into programs. Individuals
with better labor market performance in the first place are more likely to enter active labor mar-
ket programs. The estimated correlation between the transition rate to jobs and the transition
rate to training programs is very large and positive (.63), and it is moderately positive (.11 and
.13), respectively for employment programs and wage subsidies. If we account for this positive
correlation between the unobserved characteristics in the exit rate to jobs and the transition
rates to ALMPs all programs have an adverse effect on the transition rate out of unemployment.
The intuition behind this result is simple. For instance, the effects of the training program
decreases substantially because the average participant in these programs has a better a priori
labor market position than the average non-participant. This is evident in the distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity reported at the bottom of Table 2. In terms of training courses, three
relevant groups can be distinguished. The first group (80 % of the population; groups aaab
and aaba) has a high transition rate to training programs (5 % per month) as well as a high
transition rate to regular jobs (11 % per month). The second group (9 % of the population;
groups bbaa, bbba, and bbbb) has a low transition rate to training programs (2 % per month)
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and has a zero probability of finding a regular job. The third group (11 % of the population;
group abaa) has a low transition rate to the training program (2 % per month) but has a high
transition rate to jobs (11 % per month).12 Because the average training program participant is
from group one which has good unobserved job search skills, estimates of the effect of training
programs which do not allow for selectivity are upward biased. Positive selectivity is consistent
with self-selection based on the expected gain from the program as well as selection into the
program aiming at maximizing program success on the part of the public employment service
(’cream-skimming’).
Table 2 also reports the estimated correlation between the unobserved characteristics in the
three processes which account for selection into ALMP. Apparently, the temporary wage subsidy
and public employment programs are substitutes as indicated by the strongly negative (-.60)
correlation between unobservables in these two processes. Unobservable characteristics leading
to a higher chance of starting a job with temporary wage subsidy lower chances of starting a
public employment program. The correlation between transitions to training programs and the
transition rate to employment programs is moderately negative (-.34). There is a small negative
correlation (-.05) between transitions to training programs and transitions to temporary wage
subsidies.
Table 3
It is interesting to discuss whether individuals attending ALMPs are better qualified on
average than non-participants in terms of the observable covariates. Table 3 shows the effects
of selected individual characteristics on the transition rate to regular jobs as well as the three
transition rates describing the selection into ALMPs.13 The transition rate to regular jobs
is significantly affected by all covariates shown. It declines strongly with age, increases with
12Note that Table 2 reports only 6 mass points of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. The results
indicate that the remaining 10 mass points have weight zero.
13See Table A1 for the complete list of covariates.
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marriage for males whereas it decreases with marriage for females. The non-Swiss are found to
have a significantly lower exit rate from unemployment to regular jobs than the Swiss. Moreover,
individuals who have done a long apprenticeship are likely to leave unemployment after a shorter
period of unemployment has elapsed. Participants in the wage subsidy program appear to be
individuals with good observed job search skills. The transition rate to the wage subsidy program
is significantly lower for job seekers aged 40 years or older than for the young and significantly
higher for females with no or few dependents. The only group with unfavorable job search
skills likely to enter the wage subsidy program are the non-Swiss with a temporary permit of
residence for one year. It is unclear whether participants in training courses are well qualified
for job search. Whereas the entry rate to training courses is significantly higher for individuals
who have done a long apprenticeship and for females, it is also higher for the less advantaged
individual who are aged 30 years or older and for foreigners with a temporary permit of residence.
Employment programs are even less well determined by the characteristics shown in Table 3.
With the exception of the age effect (aged 40 to 50 years), none of the individual covariates is
significant.
Table 4
In order to investigate whether the program effects differ between various groups of indi-
viduals we estimated these effects differently for males and females and for foreign and Swiss
workers (Table 4). It turns out that while the point estimates of the effects of ALMP appear
to be different, the effects of most programs do not differ significantly between the groups. For
temporary wage subsidies we find a positive effect for foreign males, while for Swiss males the
effect is negative (both are significant at the 10 % level). Temporary wage subsidies decrease
the exit rate to jobs for females. The negative effect of training programs is particularly bad for
foreigners: the reduction in the transition rate to jobs is at most 30 % for the unemployed Swiss
but more than 40 % for the unemployed with non-Swiss nationality. With respect to public
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employment programs the adverse effects on the exit rate out of unemployment are smaller for
Swiss females than they are for Swiss males or foreign job seekers. Based on the point estimates
of each program, the temporary wage subsidy works best for all groups whereas employment
programs will prolong unemployment duration the most.
Table 5
In Table 5, we investigate whether the effect of programs changes with elapsed duration since
the start of the program. This allows discussing the relevance of the locking-in effect as compared
to the skill-enhancement effect of ALMPs. We distinguish between the effect in the first three
months of the program, the effect from 3 to 6 months after the start, from 6 to 9 months after the
start and more than 9 months after the start. For most of the programs the largest negative effect
is in the beginning of the program. This is consistent with the locking-in effect where individuals
reduced their efforts to find a regular job while ’locked in’ in the program. For training courses
the effect is persistently negative. There is an estimated reduction of the transition rate to jobs
of 30 % during the first two months. Thereafter, the transition rate remains at a lower level
before is becomes even slightly higher (24 %) 9 months or more after the start of the program
as compared to the beginning of the program. A potential explanation for this long-lasting
locking-in effect is that the probability of starting a second program is substantially higher for
training programs than for employment programs or wage subsidies (see last column of Table
1). Participants in the training program appear to be locked into the ALMP system rather than
into a specific course. The locking-in effect is most apparent for temporary jobs and temporary
wage subsidies. Here, it seems that as soon as the program stops, the effect of the program is
no longer negative (after 3 months for the wage subsidy, after 6 months for the employment
program).
Table 6
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The training programs can be divided into four main types of programs: basic, language,
computer or other courses (see Section 2). Table 6 reports the effects of each of these programs
in a model that allows for a separate transition rate for each of the four types of classroom
training programs, allowing for a total of 7 selection processes (basic, language, computer,
other course, employment program, and wage subsidy). Moreover, the estimates do not restrict
the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity in the transition rate to jobs and between
the unobserved heterogeneity in the transition rate to each of the ALMPs. However, due to
computational difficulties, the correlation amongst the four types of classroom training programs
was restricted to be either -1 or +1. The impact of this restriction on the estimates is arguably
minor. What is more important is to allow for unrestricted correlation between the selection
processes (transitions to basic, language, computer or other course) and the outcome process
(transitions to jobs).
Results indicate that, from a statistical point of view, the restriction to have just one selection
process for training programs can be rejected. The LR test statistic at the bottom of Table 6 is
significant at any conventional level. However, in terms of the estimated effect of ALMPs, results
are robust. All classroom training programs reduce the transition rate to jobs significantly and
the effects are quantitatively important. The average effect of training programs is similar to
the effect reported in Table 2. The reduction in the exit rate is strongest for the two programs
which last about 2 months, i.e. language courses (-47%) and other courses (-35%). The decrease
in the job hazard is less negative for the shorter training programs, i.e. computer courses (-27%)
and basic courses (-20%). Moreover, the estimated effects of employment programs and the
wage subsidy program are almost identical to the results reported previously.
Table 7
The timing of events method relies to a crucial extent on the assumption that individuals
do not change job search behavior in anticipation of future ALMP participation. Table 7 re-
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ports the final sensitivity analysis addressing anticipation effects. Anticipation of future ALMP
participation is likely to have a stronger effect on the identification of ALMP effects in cantons
which are very strict in assigning job seekers to ALMPs once unconditional benefits have lapsed.
For instance, in a canton where it is common knowledge that job seekers will have to attend a
program once benefit payments which are not linked to participation have run out, job seekers
who are not willing to attend the program will increase search intensity before benefits lapse. In
such a canton the timing of events method identifies the effect of ALMPs on the transition rate
to job by comparing the job hazard rate of participants with non-participants who are trying
hard to escape assignment to ALMPs. The ALMP effect identified in this canton confounds the
effect of a program with the effect of increased search intensity of individuals trying to escape
assignment.
To address anticipation effects, we investigate whether treatment effects are a function of the
’share of non-participants’. This variable is defined as the number of individuals who are not as-
signed to a program after unconditional benefit payments have lapsed (non-participants) divided
by the total of these non-participants and all participants. This variable is even 0 in very lax
cantons and amounts to a sizeable fraction if the canton is strict. The share of non-participants
is measured in January 1998, the earliest date for which there is reliable information.14 Table
7 shows that the estimated effects of ALMPs do not vary with the share of non-participants
across cantons. This is consistent with the fact that anticipation effects do not strongly affect
the identified ALMP effects. A potential explanation for this result is, as previously discussed
in section 4, that the time period between notification of a program and actual participation is
quite short, and that individuals are required to continue to search for jobs even if they know
that they will attend an ALMP in the future.
14Note that the sample on which our estimates are based consists only of new entrants into unemployment.
Hence the variable ’share of non-participants’ is not affected by the behavior of individuals in our sample.
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6 Conclusions
This paper evaluates the effect of participating in ALMPs on the duration of unemployment in
Switzerland. Our evaluation methodology takes possible selectivity in the inflow into programs
into account.
Our main result shows that there is an important trade-off between training the unemployed
and reducing unemployment duration. Almost all participants experience a significant reduction
in the job-hazard rate right after the start of the program, which indicates that locking-in effects
may be important. Therefore, we think it is important to structure training and employment
programs such that there is enough time for continuous job search.
All in all, ALMPs do not seem to have a positive effect on the job finding rate. The excep-
tion are temporary wage subsidies which reduce unemployment, but only for foreign workers.
Note that paying temporary wage subsidies to unemployed workers is cheaper than just paying
unemployment benefits. So, even if wage subsidies would not reduce unemployment duration
they may still be efficient from a cost-benefit point of view.
Finally, our measure of success is the extent to which ALMPs reduce individual durations of
unemployment. This is only part of the story. It could be that although ALMPs in most cases
do not reduce unemployment duration they could lead to higher wages or to a better job. We
leave the evaluation of the other components of success to future research.
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Appendix
Define Du = 1 if the spell of unemployment is completed, andDu = 0 otherwise. Define β
0
u =
( βu, δc, δe, δw), β
0
c = βc,β
0
e = βe,and β
0
w = βw. Define 1−F (λx,β0x, vx,y|t) ≡ Sx(λx,β0x, vx,y|t) =
exp(− R t0 θx(λx,β0x, vx,y|s)ds)) the survivor function which defines the probability that, until date
t, the individual has not yet left to state x = u, c, e,w. Note that in contrast to the main text,
the survivor function and the hazard are written as a function of the parameters to be estimated:
duration dependence λx, effects of observed covariates β
0
x, and the masspoints vx,y, x = u, c, e,w;
and y = a, b.
We assume first there is no unobserved heterogeneity. This means we have a degenerate
distribution of vx,y only one masspoint, say a, has support. In that case the contribution to the
likelihood of a single individual is
Liaaaa = θu(λu,β
0
u, vu,a|tiu)DuSu(λu,β0u, vu,y|tiu) ∗ (8)
θc(λc,β
0
c, vc,a|tip)DcSc(λc,β0c, vc,a|tip) ∗
θe(λe,β
0
e, ve,a|tip)DeSc(λe,β0e, ve,a|tip) ∗
θw(λw,β
0
w, vw,a|tip)DwSw(λw,β0w, vw,a|tip)
the subscript aaaa refers to the situation that y takes the value a in the transition rate to jobs,
to training programs, to employment programs and to the wage subsidy.
The likelihood contribution of an individual observed attending a training course after tip
time periods (meaning that Dc = 1, De = 0,Dw = 0) who did not start at a regular job until t
i
u
(Du = 0) reads as follows
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Liaaaa = Su(λu,β
0
u, vu,y|tiu) ∗ (9)
θc(λc,β
0
c, vc,a|tip)Sc(λc,β0c, vc,a|tip) ∗
Se(λe,β
0
e, ve,a|tip) ∗
Sw(λw,β
0
w, vw,a|tip)
= Su(λu,β
0
u, vu,y|tiu)fc(λc,β0c, vc,a|tip)Se(λe,β0e, ve,a|tip)Sw(λw,β0w, vw,a|tip)
The fact that transitions to a regular job, to an employment program and to a wage subsidy
are censored is taken into account by the survivor function to these exit states. Assuming
independence accross individuals, the log likelihood function for the entire sample (of size M)
is the log of the product of the individual likelihood contributions.
ln£ = ln
MY
i=1
Liaaaa (10)
This function is maximised with respect to λx,βx, vx,a where x = u, c, e, w. Recall that βu
contains the treatment effects. Note also that the likelihood without unobserved heterogeneity
factorizes. This implies that it is possible to estimate the parameter vector λx,βx, vx,a separately
for each process.
Now assume that we have unobserved heterogeneity. We allow for a non-degenerate distri-
bution of the masspoints vx,y and assume there are two masspoints in each process. Under this
assumption, the likelihood contribution of a single individual is
Li = paaaaL
i
aaaa + paaabL
i
aaab + ...+ pbbbbL
i
bbbb, (11)
and the log likelihood for the entire sample is
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ln£ = ln
MY
i=1
Li. (12)
Note that first, in addition to the parameters λx,βx, vx,a, we estimate 4 masspoints vx,b and
15 probabilities paaaa, paaab, ..., pbbba (pbbbb = 1− paaaa − paaab − ...− pbbba). Second, because the
individual contribution to the likeliood in (11) is a sum of products, the likelihood function does
not factorize.
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                   Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier transition rates.
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ALMP-Duration ALMP-Spells Program
# Obs. [ % ] [ Months ] [ % ] [ % ]
[ Mean ] [ SD ]
Training Courses 2729 42.7 1.3 1.0 3.4 (2.7) 40.5
   Basic Courseb) 1191 18.7 0.7 0.1 3.1 (2.4) 41.3
   Language Coursec) 487 7.6 2.4 1.0 3.6 (2.6) 41.7
   Computer Coursed) 548 8.6 0.8 0.2 3.6 (2.8) 44.0
   Other Coursee) 503 7.9 2.2 3.8 3.9 (3.2) 33.8
Employment  Programmef) 746 11.7 5.1 9.0 4.7 (3.4) 17.2
Temporary Employmentg) 2909 45.6 4.7 9.1 2.9 (2.7) 4.2
   Total 6384 100.0 3.3 2.6 3.4 (2.9) 21.2
Notes : a) First ALMP which lasted longer than one week.
b) Courses aiming at improving the effectiveness of individual job search and self-esteem.
c) Language courses (including reading and writing skills).
d) Basic word processing and spreadsheet calculation.
e) Specific computer training, business administration, technical training, courses in the tourism
    and the health sector.
f) Temporary jobs in the Non-Profit sector.
g) Temporary regular job with wage subsidy.
Source: own calculations based on AVAM/ASAL/AHV database, Swiss state secretariat (seco).
[ Months ]
Unemployment 
Duration at Entry
Descriptive Statistics of Active Labor Market Programsa)
Table 1
A B
Coeff. z Coeff. z
Treatment Effectsa)
Training program -0.105 (-3.39) -0.367 (-8.25)
Employment program -0.291 (-4.62) -0.609 (-6.36)
Wage subsidy 0.077 (2.69) -0.060 (-1.51)
Mass pointsb)
Regular job
exp(vu,a) 0.094 (45.93) 0.109 (42.81)
exp(vu,b) - 0.000 -
Training program
exp(vc,a) 0.046 (31.83) 0.052 (24.91)
exp(vc,b) - 0.019 (5.58)
Employment program
exp(ve,a) 0.014 (18.25) 0.044 (13.11)
exp(ve,b) - 0.000 -
Wage subsidy
exp(vw,a) 0.041 (33.42) 0.052 (28.17)
exp(vw,b) - 0.000 -
Probabilitiesc)
paaab - 0.177 (4.26)
pabaa - 0.619 (15.60)
pbbaa - 0.111 (1.94)
pbbaa - 0.014 (1.77)
pbbba - 0.044 (3.31)
pbbbb - 0.035 -
Correlation between
Regular Job and Training program - 0.632
Regular Job and Employment program - 0.105
Regular Job and Wage subsidy - 0.128
Training and Employment program - -0.342
Training and Wage subsidy - -0.050
Employment and Wage subsidy - -0.602
Unobserved Heterogeneity No Yes
Individual characteristics Yes Yes
Duration dependence Yes Yes
log Likelihood -56217.8 -56124.2
N 13496 13496
Table 2. The Effect of ALMPs on the transition rate to regular jobs
Multivariate Mixed Proportional Hazard Model
Notes: Asymptotic z-statistic in parentheses. 
a) Effect of ALMP on the transition rate to regular jobs, i.e. coefficient of -0.105 implies that transition 
rate to regular jobs decreases by 10 % (=exp(-0.105)-1) after starting the training program. 
b) Baseline transition rate per month (=constant), months 0 to 3. Model A allows for one constant, 
model B allows for two constants.
c) paaaa=Pr(vu=vu,a, vc=vc,a, ve=ve,a, vw=vw,a). Additional probabilities paaab, paaba, ... are estimated to be 
zero.
Source: own calculations based on AVAM/ASAL/AHV database, Swiss state secretariat (seco).
Regular job Training program Employment program Wage subsidy
Age (below 30 years)
30 to 40 years -0.188 *** 0.091 ** 0.079 0.005
40 to 50 years -0.270 *** 0.255 *** 0.491 *** -0.137 **
Marital status (single)
Married 0.121 ** 0.052 0.029 0.014
Separated -0.186 ** -0.042 -0.255 -0.112
Number of dependents 0.007 -0.003 -0.042 0.033
Female 0.075 * 0.321 *** 0.146 0.452 ***
Female * married -0.256 *** 0.007 -0.486 0.037
Female * separated 0.078 0.067 -0.545 0.115
Female * number of dependents -0.085 ** 0.011 -0.005 -0.151 ***
Permit of residence (Swiss)
For one year -0.123 ** 0.168 ** 0.163 -0.280 ***
Permanent -0.115 *** -0.005 -0.054 0.015
Apprenticeship (none)
Short (< 2 years) 0.008 0.097 -0.206 -0.083
Long (>= 2 years) 0.158 *** 0.226 *** 0.077 -0.101
log Likelihood
N
Table 3. The effect of selected individual characteristics on the transition rate to regular jobs, 
trainin programs, employment progams, and wage subsidy programs.
-56124.2
13496
Notes: *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Estimates based on Table 2, Model B. Reference category in 
parentheses. Other covariates are command of local language, position in previous job (apprentice, unskilled, skilled, 
management, self-employed or home worker), looking for same occupation in new job, previous industry (construction, 
tourism, manufacturing, transport, retail, financial services), previous occupation (agriculture, food, textiles, metals, health, 
architecture, construction, transport, tourism, printing, justice, technical drawing, office, cleaning, science, education), 
previous wage, previous wage squared, duration of previous job, recent labor market history, 1995-1997, (no job, mean wage, 
variance of wage, percentage employed, number of employment spells, percentage unemployed, number of unemployment 
spells), distant labor market history, 1988-1994, (same variables), inflow month, degree of urbanization (village, town, city), 
canton level unemployment rate in month prior to inflow, participants in ALMP / unemployed in January 1998, canton level 
voters in favor of reduction in unemployment benefits.
Source: own calculations based on AVAM/ASAL/AHV database, Swiss state secretariat (seco).
Coeff. z
Training program
Swiss males -0.371 (-7.16)
Swiss females -0.195 (-3.65)
Foreign males -0.521 (-8.53)
Foreign females -0.522 (-6.53)
Employment program
Swiss males -0.736 (-5.57)
Swiss females -0.453 (-3.09)
Foreign males -0.610 (-4.30)
Foreign females -0.669 (-3.21)
Wage subsidy
Swiss males -0.078 (-1.65)
Swiss females -0.119 (-2.01)
Foreign males 0.091 (1.71)
Foreign females -0.207 (-2.39)
Unobserved Heterogeneity Yes
Individual characteristics Yes
Duration dependence Yes
LR test (χ2(9))
log Likelihood
N
Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis: Heterogeneous treatment effects
Multivariate Mixed Proportional Hazard Model
Notes:  Asymptotic z-statistic in parentheses. 
LR test: H0: same effect for all groups, H1: heterogeneous effects.
Source: own calculations based on AVAM/ASAL/AHV database, Swiss state 
secretariat (seco).
37.0***
-56105.7
13496
Coeff. z
Training program
0 to 3 monthsa) -0.363 (-8.00)
3 to 6 months -0.328 (-5.84)
6 to 9 months -0.381 (-5.23)
9 months and more -0.271 (-3.27)
Employment program
0 to 3 months -0.945 (-7.03)
3 to 6 months -0.341 (-2.62)
6 to 9 months -0.051 (-0.33)
9 months and more -0.200 (-0.92)
Wage subsidy
0 to 3 months -0.083 (-1.87)
3 to 6 months 0.015 (0.27)
6 to 9 months -0.018 (-0.23)
9 months and more -0.005 (-0.05)
Unobserved heterogeneity Yes
Individual characteristics Yes
Duration dependence Yes
LR test (χ2(9))
log Likelihood
N
Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis: Duration dependence in the treatment effects
Multivariate Mixed Proportional Hazard Model
Notes:  Asymptotic z-statistic in parentheses. 
a) Months after start of ALMP.
LR test: H0: no duration dependence in the treatment effects, H1: duration 
dependence in the treatment effects.
Source: own calculations based on AVAM/ASAL/AHV database, Swiss state 
secretariat (seco).
62.0***
-56093.2
13496
Coeff. z
Training program
Basic course -0.217 (-3.32)
Language course -0.647 (-6.35)
Computer course -0.311 (-3.50)
Other course -0.425 (-4.78)
Employment program -0.629 (-6.67)
Wage subsidy -0.065 (-1.69)
Unobserved heterogeneity Yes
Individual characteristics Yes
Duration dependence Yes
LR test (χ2(219))
log Likelihood
N
Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis: Separate effects for training programs
Multivariate Mixed Proportional Hazard Model
Notes:  Asymptotic z-statistic in parentheses. 
LR test: H0: Transition rate to training programs does not differ by type of program 
(i.e. basic, language, computer or other course), H1: Separate transition rates for each 
training program.
Source: own calculations based on AVAM/ASAL/AHV database, Swiss state 
secretariat (seco).
13496
-59252.5
1964.7***
Coeff. z
Training program
Constant -0.400 (-9.00)
Share of non-participants in cantona) -0.280 (-0.81)
Employment program
Constant -0.622 (-6.42)
Share of non-participants in cantona) -0.097 (-0.12)
Wage subsidy
Constant -0.066 (-1.68)
Share of non-participants in cantona) 0.083 (0.23)
Unobserved heterogeneity Yes
Individual characteristics Yes
Duration dependence Yes
LR test (χ2(7))
log Likelihood
N
Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis: Anticipation effects
Multivariate Mixed Proportional Hazard Model
-56096.5
13496
Notes:  Asymptotic z-statistic in parentheses.
a) Number of individuals who do not participante in ALMP after unconditional 
unemployment benefits have lapsed (see main text for a definition) divided by the 
sum of  participants and non-participants in January 1998, by canton.  
LR test: H0: Share of non-participants is insignificant in each process, H1: Effect 
of share of non-participants is not zero in at least one process. Additional 
probabilities (see main text) are estimated to be zero.
Source: own calculations based on AVAM/ASAL/AHV database, Swiss state 
secretariat (seco).
55.4***
Regular Job Training program Employment program Wage subsidy
Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Treatment effectsa)
training program -0.367 (-8.25)
employment program -0.609 (-6.36)
wage subsidy -0.060 (-1.51)
Female 0.074 (1.81) 0.321 (4.83) 0.146 (1.00) 0.452 (6.38)
Married 0.119 (2.22) 0.051 (0.55) 0.029 (0.13) 0.014 (0.15)
Separated -0.187 (-2.54) -0.042 (-0.36) -0.254 (-0.97) -0.112 (-0.94)
Female * married -0.257 (-3.11) 0.007 (0.06) -0.486 (-1.52) 0.038 (0.27)
Female * separated 0.079 (0.79) 0.066 (0.42) -0.545 (-1.44) 0.116 (0.71)
Number of dependents 0.008 (0.47) -0.003 (-0.09) -0.042 (-0.56) 0.033 (1.12)
Female * number of dependents -0.085 (-2.57) 0.010 (0.21) -0.005 (-0.04) -0.151 (-2.64)
Age (20-30)
30-40 -0.199 (-5.90) 0.071 (1.26) 0.114 (0.87) 0.040 (0.71)
40-50 -0.291 (-6.91) 0.237 (3.55) 0.568 (3.35) -0.087 (-1.23)
Residence permint (Swiss)
yearly -0.124 (-2.46) 0.167 (2.05) 0.166 (0.84) -0.280 (-3.21)
permanent -0.115 (-2.97) -0.005 (-0.07) -0.053 (-0.34) 0.015 (0.23)
Command of local language (bad)
as second language 0.015 (0.33) -0.090 (-1.23) 0.053 (0.30) -0.013 (-0.18)
as mother tongue -0.030 (-0.77) -0.086 (-1.30) 0.225 (1.42) 0.095 (1.46)
Apprenticeship (has not done an apprenticeship)
<= 2 years 0.007 (0.16) 0.097 (1.29) -0.205 (-1.24) -0.083 (-1.15)
> 2 years 0.158 (3.89) 0.227 (3.36) 0.077 (0.53) -0.101 (-1.49)
Position in previous job (home worker or self-employed)
apprentice -0.037 (-0.29) -0.040 (-0.20) -0.575 (-1.40) -0.012 (-0.04)
unskilled -0.372 (-3.83) -0.183 (-1.28) -0.096 (-0.34) 0.384 (2.01)
skilled -0.248 (-2.60) -0.150 (-1.08) -0.439 (-1.61) 0.284 (1.51)
manager -0.371 (-3.19) -0.088 (-0.53) -1.074 (-2.31) 0.078 (0.36)
Looking for same occupation in new job 0.130 (4.26) -0.126 (-2.67) -0.243 (-2.22) 0.008 (0.16)
(continued)
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Previous industry (no)
construction 0.177 (3.87) -0.088 (-1.04) 0.036 (0.19) 0.041 (0.54)
tourism 0.099 (1.69) -0.029 (-0.31) -0.337 (-1.60) 0.110 (1.07)
manufacturing 0.064 (1.48) 0.081 (1.19) -0.050 (-0.30) -0.054 (-0.74)
transport 0.190 (3.01) 0.076 (0.71) -0.506 (-2.05) -0.015 (-0.14)
retail -0.047 (-1.12) 0.200 (3.09) -0.414 (-2.47) -0.116 (-1.57)
finance 0.017 (0.22) 0.174 (1.52) -0.191 (-0.55) -0.264 (-1.83)
Previous occupation (no)
agriculture 0.221 (2.39) -0.545 (-2.74) 0.670 (2.00) 0.254 (1.68)
food -0.023 (-0.18) -0.061 (-0.30) 0.398 (0.83) -0.229 (-0.88)
textiles -0.035 (-0.19) -0.053 (-0.23) 0.343 (0.62) -0.143 (-0.47)
metals 0.018 (0.37) -0.290 (-3.36) -0.718 (-3.53) 0.094 (1.14)
health 0.031 (0.39) -0.324 (-2.39) -0.198 (-0.67) -0.271 (-1.88)
architecture 0.039 (0.35) 0.504 (3.50) 0.806 (2.31) -0.220 (-1.18)
construction 0.147 (2.83) -0.499 (-4.92) -0.011 (-0.05) 0.056 (0.66)
transport 0.046 (0.63) -0.148 (-1.21) -0.028 (-0.10) 0.331 (3.04)
tourism 0.146 (2.41) 0.000 (0.00) -0.051 (-0.24) 0.149 (1.40)
printing -0.541 (-0.51) 0.285 (0.20) 2.260 (0.82) 1.131 (0.90)
justice -0.120 (-0.65) -0.310 (-1.05) -0.209 (-0.31) -0.240 (-0.77)
technical drawing 0.057 (0.90) -0.060 (-0.56) 0.105 (0.42) -0.003 (-0.02)
office 0.183 (4.09) 0.100 (1.52) 0.107 (0.61) -0.266 (-3.34)
cleaning 0.007 (0.09) -0.194 (-1.49) -1.011 (-2.94) 0.259 (1.95)
science 0.066 (0.62) -0.105 (-0.62) 0.588 (1.45) -0.403 (-2.18)
education -0.190 (-2.05) -0.290 (-1.92) 0.506 (1.84) 0.274 (2.08)
previous wage (/1000) -0.050 (-3.15) 0.100 (3.86) -0.113 (-1.58) 0.397 (12.44)
previous wage squared 0.000 (-0.18) -0.014 (-4.00) 0.009 (0.78) -0.059 (-13.39)
duration of previous job (years) -0.030 (-4.62) 0.013 (1.27) 0.025 (0.95) 0.000 (0.02)
Recent labor market history, 1995-1997
no job -0.018 (-0.11) 0.251 (1.30) -0.602 (-1.34) -0.692 (-1.51)
mean wage (/1000) 0.062 (4.56) 0.009 (0.40) -0.052 (-0.85) -0.018 (-0.68)
variance of monthly wage -0.002 (-2.33) 0.000 (0.09) -0.067 (-1.93) 0.002 (0.63)
percentage employed 0.558 (6.43) 0.084 (0.64) -0.325 (-1.12) 0.945 (5.96)
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number of employment spells 0.039 (2.15) -0.089 (-2.78) 0.034 (0.52) 0.024 (0.75)
percentage unemployed -0.507 (-3.67) -1.034 (-4.88) -0.291 (-0.68) -0.207 (-0.83)
number of unemployment spells 0.093 (4.92) 0.032 (0.98) 0.053 (0.78) 0.001 (0.03)
Distant labor market history, 1995-1997
no job 0.296 (2.85) 0.081 (0.52) -0.517 (-1.55) -0.111 (-0.59)
mean wage (/1000) 0.003 (0.24) -0.005 (-0.25) -0.105 (-2.09) -0.061 (-3.05)
variance of monthly wage 0.002 (0.71) -0.004 (-0.65) -0.009 (-0.85) 0.006 (1.17)
percentage employed 0.366 (3.88) -0.189 (-1.33) -0.489 (-1.61) 0.223 (1.34)
number of employment spells 0.026 (2.93) -0.042 (-2.64) -0.067 (-1.84) -0.035 (-2.27)
percentage unemployed -0.946 (-4.53) 0.488 (1.48) -0.158 (-0.26) -0.150 (-0.42)
number of unemployment spells -0.037 (-2.05) -0.005 (-0.16) 0.117 (1.94) 0.009 (0.32)
Inflow month (december 1997)
january 1998 0.079 (2.46) -0.151 (-2.77) 0.171 (1.42) -0.063 (-1.16)
february 1998 0.088 (2.12) -0.130 (-1.91) -0.053 (-0.33) -0.165 (-2.25)
march 1998 0.038 (0.83) -0.137 (-1.86) -0.135 (-0.78) -0.098 (-1.22)
Degree of urbanization (village)
town -0.125 (-4.38) 0.061 (1.29) -0.147 (-1.31) -0.018 (-0.36)
city -0.300 (-8.01) 0.013 (0.21) -0.200 (-1.43) -0.232 (-3.68)
At the canton level
log unemployment rate -0.252 (-4.09) -0.272 (-2.51) -0.198 (-0.84) 0.077 (0.73)
log participants in ALMP / 
unemployedJanuary 1998 -0.064 (-1.05) 0.610 (6.18) 0.908 (3.90) 0.007 (0.06)
log approval of a cut in 
benefits, September 1997. 0.219 (4.15) 0.309 (3.63) -0.359 (-1.88) 0.185 (2.07)
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Duration dependence (0 to 3 months)
3 to 6 0.578 (20.22) 0.307 (6.62) 0.898 (9.23) 0.062 (1.28)
6 to 12 0.304 (7.95) -0.290 (-3.82) 1.109 (8.16) -0.387 (-5.02)
12 and more 0.140 (2.23) -0.493 (-3.34) 1.200 (4.24) -0.681 (-4.17)
Mass pointsb)
exp(vu,a) 0.109 (42.81)
exp(vu,b) 0.000 -
exp(vc,a) 0.052 (24.91)
exp(vc,b) 0.019 (5.58)
exp(ve,a) 0.044 (13.11)
exp(ve,b) 0.000 -
exp(vw,a) 0.052 (28.17)
exp(vw,b) 0.000 -
Probabilitiesc)
paaab 0.177 (4.26)
pabaa 0.619 (15.60)
pbbaa 0.111 (1.94)
pbbaa 0.014 (1.77)
pbbba 0.044 (3.31)
pbbbb 0.035 -
log Likelihood -56124.2
N 13496
Notes: Reference category and asymptotic z-statistic in parentheses. 
a) Effect of ALMP on the transition rate to regular jobs, i.e. coefficient of -0.105 implies that transition rate to regular jobs decreases by 10 % (=exp(-0.105)-1) after starting 
the training program. 
b) Baseline transition rate per month (=constant), months 0 to 3.
c) paaaa=Pr(vu=vu,a, vc=vc,a, ve=ve,a, vw=vw,a). Additional probabilities paaab, paaba, ... are estimated to be zero.
Source: own calculations based on AVAM/ASAL/AHV database, Swiss state secretariat (seco).
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